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Sloviter: If Courts Are Open, Must Cameras Follow?

IF COURTS ARE OPEN, MUST CAMERAS
FOLLOW?
Dolores K. Sloviter*
It has become a fact of the video age that every high-profile criminal trial is accompanied by a demand for live television coverage of the
proceedings. The spirited debate on the advisability of permitting live
television coverage of criminal trials has been fueled by the different
atmospheres that prevailed at the trials of O.J. Simpson, where live coverage was permitted, and Timothy McVeigh, where it was not. It has
even been suggested that the pervasiveness of television during Simpson's highly publicized trial had a direct connection to his ultimate acquittal for the murder of his former wife and her companion.

Inasmuch as no trial can be replicated in laboratory conditions, scientific experimentation is not possible, and we thus have no empirical
data on the effect of television on a criminal trial from which to make
policy decisions. Not surprisingly, the absence of evidence has not left
us with a dearth of commentary and arguments on all sides of the dialogue.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. These comments are
based on some portions of the 12th Annual Howard Kaplan Memorial Lecture given by Judge
Sloviter at Hofstra University School of Law on November 5, 1997. The Author wishes to thank
her law clerk, Michael B. DeSanctis, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See S.L. Alexander, The Impact of California v. Simpson on Cameras in the Courtroom,
79 JUDIcATURE 169, 172 (1996) ("The Simpson case has fueled a flurry of renewed attention to
the controversy over courtroom cameras .... ); Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of
the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. CoLO. L. REv. 989, 1011 (1996)
(discussing Judge Ito's conduct in the courtroom); Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1254-55 (1996) (discussing the effect of the O.J. Simpson trial on arguments
for cameras in the courtroom); Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV-That Is the Question, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRI MNOLOGY 928, 981 (1996) (noting that the O.J. Simpson trial was "a trial which eclipses
both surveys and speculation to demonstrate the disastrous reality of cameras in the courtroom");
Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising the JudicialBranch: In Furtherance of the
Public's FirstAmendment Rights, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1519, 1519 (1996) (criticizing cameras in
the courtroom in the O.J. Simpson trial); Gerald F. Uelmen, The Trial as a Circus: Inherit the
Wind, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1221, 1222 (1996) (noting the current movement to ban television cameras from the courtrooms in the wake of the O.J. Simpson trial).
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From my view, one of the most provocative arguments made by

those who champion live media coverage has been that it is merely an
extension of the public trial right. Steven Brill, the founder of the Court-

room Television Network and, as could be expected, one of the most ardent supporters of televising trials, has even gone so far as to label2those
who have views different than his as being in favor of secret trials.
I have always viewed myself as a staunch supporter of the public's
right to know about the court system and what transpires in pending
cases, 3 and thus I was troubled that I did not instinctively find the connection between the right of public trial and televising trial proceedings
as compelling as Mr. Brill does.4 It seemed that I needed to re-examine
the genesis and rationale of the right of public access to trials before
considering whether I agreed that the right to televise trial proceedings
follows inexorably.
I. ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS

We begin with the notable absence in the Constitution of any provision that mentions a right of the public to access to court proceedings.
The Sixth Amendment, the sole provision to refer to a public trial, lists
it among the rights of the criminal defendant.5
2. See Steven Brill, Courtroom Cameras,72 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1181, 1181 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding a presumptive right to public access to materials filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions); Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653,
662 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding a common law presumptive right of public access to material filed in
connection with a summary judgment motion); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel
Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that there is a presumption of access to the settlement agreement filed with the court); United States v. Criden (In re National
Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the media has a right to copy
videotapes introduced in the Abscam trial, and declaring that "there is a strong presumption that
material introduced into evidence at trial should be made reasonably accessible in a manner suitable for copying and broader dissemination").
4. Other commentators argue, without case law authority, that the First Amendment requires giving access at trials to electronic and television media. See, e.g., Susan E. Harding, Note,
Cameras and the Need for UnrestrictedElectronic Media Access to Federal Courtrooms, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 827 (1996); Kathleen M. Krygier, Comment, The Thirteenth Juror: Electronic Media'sStruggle to EnterState and Federal Courtrooms,3 CoMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 71 (1995). But
cf. Elizabeth M. Hodgkins, Note, Throwing Open a Window on the Nation's Courts by Lifting the
Ban on Federal Courtroom Television, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 89, 92 (1995) ("[C]ourtroom

television presently floats uneasily in First Amendment limbo.").
5. The text of the Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
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The inclusion by the framers of our Constitution of the right of an
open trial among the panoply of rights secured to a criminal defendant
followed naturally as it was one of the features of basic criminal procedure that came to the colonies from England. In fact, the Supreme
Court has noted that from the time even before the Norman conquest,
the one constant from early times was the public character of the criminal trial-a trial "open to all who cared to observe."7 At the time our organic laws were adopted, it was "an indispensable attribute of an AngloAmerican trial."8
The "Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously
ascribed to the notorious use of [secret trials] by the Spanish Inquisition,
to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French
monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet."9 Whatever its origin, the right
to a public trial was sufficiently ingrained at the time of the framing of
our Constitution that its inclusion was apparently taken as unexceptional, as we have no record of it being the subject of much dispute.1°
The language of the Sixth Amendment, specifically, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial,"" has led the Supreme Court to treat the right to a public
trial "as [a right] created for the benefit of the defendant."' 12 While the
Court upheld a defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to protest
the secrecy of his trial, 3 it held in Gannett Co. v. DePasqualethat there
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
6. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
7. Id. at 564. For a thorough discussion of the public nature of criminal trials, see id. at
564-69.
8. Id. at 569.
9. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948) (citations omitted).
10. There is some irony in recalling that the framers themselves met behind closed doors and
deliberated in secret. Before the Convention that drafted the Constitution was finally adjourned,
the Journals and other papers of the Convention were deposited in the hands of the President,
George Washington, and covered by a seal of secrecy until 1819 when John Quincy Adams, the
Secretary of State, had them printed at the request of President Monroe. See 1 THE RECORDS OF
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, xi-xiii
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
12. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979). The issue in Gannett involved the
right of a newspaper publisher to insist on access to a pretrial suppression hearing. See id. at 37071. In addition to holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require public access in the situation
where parties agree to closure, see id. at 384, the Court held that there was no public right to attend
pretrial proceedings under English common law, see id. at 389, and that even if the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do guarantee a public right, the defendant's right to a fair trial thereafter
outweighed any right of the public. See id. at 392-93.
13. See, e.g., Oliver,333 U.S. at 272-73.
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was no "correlative right in members of the public to insist upon a public trial.' 14 That holding rejected the argument of a newspaper publisher
that "members of the public have an enforceable right to a public trial
that can be asserted independently of the parties in the litigation."'"
To be sure, the Court acknowledged that there was a "strong societal interest in public trials.' ' 16 However, by a bare five-Justice majority,
the Court declined to catapult that societal interest into an enforceable
right, saying, "[r]ecognition of an independent public interest in the enforcement of Sixth Amendment guarantees is a far cry ...from the
creation of a constitutional right on the part of the public."' 7
Yet, a year later, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,"s the
Court, with only one dissent, was to find precisely such a constitutional
right, albeit not in the Sixth Amendment.' 9 The issue arose when a defendant accused of murder decided he would prefer to forego his right to
a public trial accorded by the Sixth Amendment. 0 His decision may
have had something to do with the fact that he was facing his fourth trial
for murder in the Circuit Court of Hanover County, Virginia.2' The
prosecutor did not object to the waiver, and the trial judge granted defendant's motion to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom.22 But a local newspaper, whose reporters had been excluded,
moved to vacate the closure order and was initially unsuccessful, both in
the trial court and the Virginia Supreme Court.2
By the time the newspaper's appeal reached the United States Supreme Court, the defendant had been found not guilty by the trial
court.24 The Supreme Court nonetheless chose to consider "whether a
criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required
14. Gannett,443 U.S. at 381.
15. l at 383.
16. IL
17. Id. Justice Powell, who was a member of the five-Justice majority, believed that the
press and the public do have a Frst Amendment right of access, see id. at 397-98, but he concurred on the ground that the trial court adequately protected that right by hearing the representatives of the press and concluding that in the circumstances of that case closure was appropriate.
See id at 402-03.
18. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
19. See id. at 580.
20. See id. at 559-60.
21. Stevenson, the defendant, had been convicted of second-degree murder, but that conviction was overturned for improper admission of evidence; both his second and third trials ended in
mistrials, the third partly as a result of some newspaper publicity. See id. at 559.
22. See id. at 560.
23. See id. at 560-62.
24. See id. at 562-63.
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to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other
overriding consideration requires closure." In other words, do the public and the press have a right grounded in the Constitution to attend a
criminal trial independent of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial?
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, found that there is
such a right of public access to criminal trials, and that it emanates from
the penumbra of the specific protections enumerated in the First
Amendment. 6 His opinion distinguished Gannett rather summarily on
the ground that it dealt with access to hearings on pretrial motions,
rather than on a right of access to trials, and that the Court there did not
decide whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right
of the public to attend trials.27 He then declared that in guaranteeing free
speech, along with the correlative right to receive information, a free
press, and the right of the people to assemble in public places, "the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend
trials so as to give meaning [and effect] to those explicit guarantees." '
The Justices' different views generated a total of six additional opinions: two concurring opinions, three separate opinions concurring in the
judgment, and one dissent.
It is primarily to Richmond Newspapers, the foundation on which
the public right to access to court proceedings rests, that one must look
to analyze whether the rationale that the Court enunciated for a right to
public access applies equally to television in the courtroom.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger spoke of the therapeutic, cathartic value that public access to criminal trials has for the community,
making it easier for the public to accept particular verdicts and engendering public respect for and confidence in the judicial system.29 He referred to the "'educative effect of public attendance,"'' 0 which affords
the public "'a form of legal education.' ' 3' He commented on the
"concern and importance to the people [of] the manner in which criminal trials are conducted. ' 2 He also placed great emphasis on the role
played by open access to judicial proceedings in "enhanc[ing] the in25. Id. at 564.
26. See id. at 580.
27. See id. at 564, 580-81.
28. Id. at 575.
29. See id. at 570-72.
30. Id. at 572 (quoting 6 JOHN H. wIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834,
at 438 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1976)).
31. Id. (quoting State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966)).
32. Id. at 575.
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tegrity and quality of what takes place [in the courtroom].""
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan echoed many of these
policy considerations. For him, the First Amendment "has a structural
role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment."' Encouraging receipt of information through public access to trials fosters informed debate and meaningful discussion of government affairs, thereby enabling the people to "'resolve their own destiny.' ' 35 He has also viewed access as allowing the public to act as a
check on the judiciary,36 and as discouraging perjury by witnesses and
corrupt decision making by judges.'
Cases in which the Supreme Court extended the public right of access to trials followed quickly after Richmond Newspapers. Two years
later, the Court held that a Massachusetts statute requiring that trials for
specified sexual offenses against minors must be closed during the victim's testimony violated the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, recognized that the
reasons given for the statute, i.e., the protection of minor victims of sex
crimes from further trauma and embarrassment and encouragement of
such victims to come forward and testify, could be compelling reasons
for closure, but stated that the decision to close vel non had to be made
on a case-by-case basis.39
The next line of cases focused on which proceedings other than the
trial were covered by the right of access. In Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court ("Press-EnterpriseI"),4 the Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, held that it was unconstitutional for the trial court to order the closing of the voir dire of prospective jurors in a capital criminal
trial of a defendant charged with rape and murder of a teenage girl.4 '
Jury selection had traditionally been open in England42 and "was the
common practice in America when the Constitution was adopted."43 The
right to attend the voir dire, a right held by everyone in the community,
33. Id. at 578.
34. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 587 n.3 (quoting Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974)
(Powell, J., dissenting)). For a brief discussion of the necessity of informed debate to selfgovernment, see id. at 587-88.
36. See Gannett, 448 U.S. at 592, 596.
37. See id. at 596-97.
38. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982).
39. See id. at 607-10.
40. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
41. See id. at 510-13.
42. See id. at 505-08.
43. Id. at 508.
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was said to promote fairness. 4 Significant to our purposes is the Chief
Justice's further statement that "[t]he value of openness lies in the fact
that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed ....4'
Two years later, in Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court ("PressEnterpriseI,"),46 the issue arose again when a California trial court ruling on motion of the defendant, a nurse charged with murdering twelve
patients by administering massive doses of the heart drug lidocaine,
both closed the lengthy evidentiary preliminary hearings and prevented
the release of the transcript to the public.47 The California Supreme
Court held that the right of public access to criminal proceedings extended only to the actual criminal trial itself.48 In reversing, the United
States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the First Amendment right
of access also attaches to preliminary hearings and noting that in criminal cases the preliminary hearings often are "the final and most important step" in the proceedings.49
Continuing the series of cases expanding the public right to access,
the Court in Waller v. Georgia50 also applied the open access presumption to a suppression hearing.51 That decision was of particular significance because, as noted above, the Court held in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale," only five years earlier, that the press could be excluded from
a suppression hearing.53 Of course, in Gannettthe defendant had agreed
to the closure, whereas in Waller the defendant objected.55 Thus, the
holding of Waller, that the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial extends to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the presentation of evidence to the jury, 6 was not exceptional. What was of particular interest was the Court's absorption of the intervening First Amend44. See id.
45. Id.
46. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
47. See id. at 3-6.
48. See id. at 5.
49. Id. at 12. Although the California Superior Court already released the transcript by the
time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court held that the case was not moot
because "this [type of] controversy is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review."' Id. at 6 (quoting
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 596, 603 (1982), and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1979)).
50. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
51. Seeid.at47.
52. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
53. See id. at 394.
54. See id. at 368. In fact, the defendant requested the closure. See id.
55. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 42.
56. See id. at 47.
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ment precedent into the Sixth Amendment analysis. The Court stated
flatly, "[t]he explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less
protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of
the press and public."57 It concluded that "under the Sixth Amendment
any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused
the tests set out in Press-Enterprise [I] and its predecesmust meet
8
5

sors."

The steady expansion of the scope of the public's right of access to
court proceedings could be viewed as the prelude to a holding that televising those proceedings, which provides the opportunity for exposure
to a broader audience, necessarily is encompassed within the public
right of access. However, the Court itself has consistently cautioned that
there may be instances in which access would be inappropriate, and that
competing policy or prudential concerns may come into play." More
important, the Court's two decisions that raised the permissibility of
televised proceedings do not analyze the issue in terms of any public
right of access.
I.

SUPREME COURT CASES ON CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM

The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to examine the constitutional implications of the presence of cameras in the courtroom in
Estes v. Texas,6° fifteen years before it enunciated the public right of access in Richmond Newspapers. The occasion was the trial of Billie Sol
Estes, a political mover and shaker from Texas in the era of Lyndon
Johnson, who was charged in a Texas court with fraud and obtaining
property from local farmers through false pretenses and fraudulent representations.6' The media, particularly television, showed intense interest in the proceedings. 2
Although the pretrial proceedings concerned issues that were
hardly dramatic, the accounts given by the Justices portray the courtroom as a media zoo. At least twelve camera operators were present,
cables and wires covered the courtroom floor, three microphones were
placed on the judge's bench, 63 close-ups were taken of documents as
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id. at 47.

59. See, e.g., id. at 45; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07
(1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).
60. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
61. Seeid. at534-35.
62. See id. at 535-38.
63. See id. at 536.
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they were being read by the defendant and his counsel at counsel's table,64 at least thirty people were standing in the aisles, photographers
were "roaming at will" about the courtroom and behind the bench, 5 and
the jurors themselves were filmed. 6 It was conceded that the cameras
had caused a "considerable disruption." 67 Incredibly, four of the jurors
who were later empaneled had seen or heard all or part of the broadcast
of these pretrial proceedings.6 At the trial, the only live television
broadcast was of the prosecution's closing argument and the return of
the jury verdict, in addition to short clips of the rest of the trial used
simply as a backdrop for a reporter's coverage.69
Estes was convicted and appealed on the ground that he was deprived of due process by the televising and broadcasting of his trial.7"
The Supreme Court agreed. Justice Clark, writing an opinion for the
Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas
and Goldberg,7 was of the opinion that in all criminal cases cameras
deprived defendants of a fair trial, and their presence in the courtroom
was per se unconstitutional." The crucial fifth vote came from Justice
Harlan, who expressly limited his concurrence in the opinion (and,
therefore, the holding of the majority) to high-profile or notorious
criminal cases."
In considering the manner and extent to which cameras affect the
fairness of the trial, the Court emphasized that court proceedings are
held, as it said, "for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the
truth which is the sine qua non of a fair trial."7 4
The Court examined the effects of television cameras on the principal trial participants, i.e., jurors, witnesses, judges, and the defendant
and defense counsel." The Court believed that jurors would be subjected
not only to the physical distraction caused by the cameras, but the men-

64. See id. at 538.
65. Id. at 553 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
66. See id. at 609 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Photographs of what the courtroom looked like
with all the cameras are in an appendix to Chief Justice Warren's concurrence. See id. at 586.
67. Id. at 536.
68. See id. at 538.
69. See id. at 537.
70. See id. at 534-35.
71. Chief Justice Warren wrote a concurring opinion, with which Justices Douglas and
Goldberg joined, joining Justice Clark's opinion to express additional views on why the televising
of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process. See id. at 552.
72. See id. at 542-44,550-52.
73. See id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 540.
75. See id. at 545-50.
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tal distraction caused from the broadcasting of a notorious trial that
converts it into a cause celebre, thereby rendering jurors far more likely
to deliver a verdict influenced
by societal pressures that have no busi76
ness in the courtroom.
Although the "impact" on the witnesses was "incalculable," the
Court thought "[s]ome may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky
and given to overstatement," some embarrassed and others "reluctant to
appear.""
Judges also are "subject to the same psychological reactions as
laymen. '78 The Court noted that especially where judges are elected,
"telecasting of a trial becomes a political weapon." 7 Though it characterized judges as "high-minded men and women," the Court believed
that judges could find it "difficult to remain oblivious to the pressures
that the news media can bring to bear on them both directly and through
the shaping of public opinion."80
The Court was particularly concerned about the impact on the defendant who "is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or
nationwide arena," stating:"'
The inevitable close-ups of [the defendant's] gestures and expressions
during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings
before him-sometimes the difference between life and deathdispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance."2
Finally, the Court worried that telecasting may deprive the defendant of effective counsel and anticipated that "the temptation offered by
television to play to the public audience might ... have a direct effect
not only upon the lawyers, but [on the other principal participants]."83
Justice Harlan, the key fifth vote, in traditional fashion went no
further than he had to; he made his view clear that "[n]o constitutional

76. See id. at 545-46; see also id. at 577 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("This Court would no
longer be able to point to the dignity and calmness of the courtroom as a protection from outside
influences. For the television camera penetrates this protection and brings into the courtroom tangible evidence of the widespread interest in a case .....
77. Id. at 547.
78. Id. at 548.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 548-49.
81. Id. at 549.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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provision guarantees a right to televise trials."' Moreover, he stated that
"the Court should proceed only step by step in this unplowed field."
He limited his joinder in the opinion of the majority to a case that was
heavily publicized and highly sensational, such as the Estes case, and
concluded that in such a case, the considerations against allowing televising far outweigh countervailing factors.86 Justice Harlan concurred
while acknowledging that the televising of the proceedings at Estes's
trial was "relatively unobtrusive," as the cameras were contained in a
booth at the back of the courtroom."'
In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Black, Brennan, and
White, thought it was unwise policy, at least then, to introduce television into a courtroom." However, he noted that there was only limited
live telecasting during the Estes trial itself, that there was no claim
based on any First Amendment right, and that he himself was wary of a
per se rule which, in light of future technology, might limit true First
Amendment rights."
The Justices made clear that this was not the last word on this issue, and that it would have to be revisited in the future if there were
technological advances made with television.'
The future, and with it another opportunity to consider cameras in
9 1 That
the courtroom, came sixteen years later in Chandler v. Florida.
case was one of local public interest, as the defendants were policemen
charged with robberies and the trial had been televised over the defendants' objection.n Chandler and a co-defendant appealed after they were
convicted, basing their due process challenge on Estes.93
The Court rejected Chandler's challenge and upheld the broadcasting without overruling Estes.9 It stated:
Estes is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring still
photographic, radio, and television coverage in all cases and under all
circumstances. It does not stand as an absolute ban on state experimentation with an evolving technology, which, in terms of modes of mass

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 588 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Id. at590-91.
See id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
See id. at 601.
See id. at 602-04.
See id. at 540, 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 604 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
449 U.S. 560 (1981).

92. See id. at 567-68.
93. See id. at 568, 570.
94. See id. at 582-83.
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communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964, and is, even now,
in a state of continuing change.95
Thus, retreating somewhat from the opinion of the Court in Estes, the
Chandler Court held that on a due process challenge it was the defendant's burden to show actual prejudice resulting from the broadcast-a
burden that had not been met by the defendants in that case.96
In light of the difference in result between Estes and Chandler,one
might find it significant that only three Justices who sat on the Court in
1965, Brennan, Stewart, and White, were still on the bench in 1981and that all three had dissented in Estes.97
More important was the markedly different use of cameras at the
two trials. Florida, unlike Texas, had imposed a restrictive court rule
aimed at limiting the influence of cameras on the trial.9" Only one camera was allowed. The equipment was to be placed in a fixed location and
not moved. Lenses and film cartridges could not be changed during the
proceedings. The jurors would not be filmed. No audio recordings of
attorney conferences or side bar discussions were permitted, and furthermore, the judge had discretion to prohibit coverage of certain witness. 9 There can be little doubt that such safeguards were instrumental
in convincing the Chandler Court not to pretermit experimentation by
states with televising their court proceedings.
In both Estes and Chandler,the focus was on the effect televising
the trial had on whether the defendant received a fair trial. If cameras in
the courtroom are to be rationalized in terms of the public's right of access to court proceedings stemming from the First Amendment, it would
have been only natural for the Supreme Court to have made that connection. The Chandler case was decided within a year of Richmond
Newspapers, but the Court did not rely on any First Amendment right of
the public or the press in upholding the Florida rule permitting cameras.
To the contrary, it suggested otherwise by expressly noting that in
authorizing cameras "the Florida Supreme Court pointedly rejected any
state or federal constitutional right of access on the part of photogra95. Id. at 573-74 (footnote omitted). Justice Stewart and Justice White each concurred separately, stating that Estes should be overruled. See id. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 587
(White, J., concurring).
96. Seeid. at581.
97. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 601 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
joined Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Chandler.See Chandler,449 U.S. at 561. Both
Justice Stewart and Justice White wrote opinions concurring in the judgment in Chandler.See id.
at 583, 586.
98. See Chandler,449 U.S. at 565-66.
99. See id. at 566.
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phers or the broadcast media to televise or electronically record and
thereafter disseminate court proceedings."'
The Chandler Court continued its obvious concurrence with the
Florida court's conclusion by characterizing its holding as "carefully
framed" and then quoting that court's holding verbatim:
While we have concluded that the due process clause does not prohibit
electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings per se, by the same
token we reject the argument of the [Post-Newsweek stations] that the
first and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution mandate
entry of the electronic media into judicial proceedings.' 0
The Florida Supreme Court in turn relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,'02 denying the television networks the right to copy tapes made by President Nixon that
were introduced in the criminal trials against the President's advisors in
the Watergate cases. 3 The Court in Chandlerquoted from language in
Nixon when it said, "'[i]n the first place, ... there is no constitutional
right to have [live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast. Second,
of a public trial ... confers no special benefit on the
...the guarantee
,
press."" '
The decisions of those federal courts of appeals that have directly
addressed the issue of cameras in the courtroom have also rejected the
suggestion that the media has any constitutional right to televise proceedings. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits upheld blanket bans on
cameras in federal criminal proceedings, concluding that the right of access enunciated in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspapers Co.
was a right simply to attend, not to televise or record. 0 5 In a similar
holding for the Second Circuit,0 6 Judge Oakes wrote:
100. Id. at 569 (referring to In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.
2d 764, 774 (Fla. 1979)).
101. Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Post-Newsiveek Stations, 370 So. 2d at 774).
102. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In Nixon, the Supreme Court decided that the Nixon papers should
not be released under the common law right of access to judicial records because the Presidential
Recordings Act already prescribed an avenue of public access. See id. at 604-08.
103. Seeid.at591.
104. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 610
(citations omitted)).
105. See United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620-22 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (1lth Cir. 1983).
106. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984). General
Westmoreland had filed a civil defamation action against Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS")
for its claim that he and the military command distorted intelligence data during the Vietnam War
to make it appear more optimistic than it was. Both parties had consented to being filmed, but
televising was barred because of a district court local rule banning cameras in civil cases. See id. at
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There is a long leap ...between a public right under the First
Amendment to attend trials and a public right under the First Amendment to see a given trial televised. It is a leap that is not7 supported by
history. It is a leap that we are not yet prepared to take.
Under the case law to date, televised trials are neither constitutionally prohibited in all instances nor are they constitutionally mandated in any instance. The analysis now must shift to whether the reasons underlying the public right of access to trials apply equally to
expanding that access via contemporaneous televising of the trials.
III.

CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC AccEss RATIONALE

Review of the Supreme Court's cases in the last two decades shows
that the rationale given for finding a right of the public and the press to
attend court proceedings has been primarily that the open trial enhances
the quality, and safeguards the integrity, of the fact-finding function,
thereby serving as a check upon the judicial process. Such a check fosters an appearance of fairness that heightens public respect for, and
confidence in, the judicial process, while having an educative effect.
I turn first to the important-perhaps central-purpose served by
open trials, namely "discourag[ing] perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality."'0 3 There seems
no reason why the benefits of such observation of a trial would not flow
just as effectively from the presence of neutral observers in the courtroom as it would under the eyes of scattered observers watching via
television.
In Nixon, the Court stated, "[t]he requirement of a public trial is
satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to
attend the trial and to report what they have observed."'" The same
point was made by Chief Justice Warren in his separate concurring
opinion in the Estes case, where he recognized that as long as a courtroom has facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, "'[t]hose who see and hear what transpired can report it
with impunity."' 0 Arguably, the value of openness in deterring witness
17-18.
107.

Id. at 23.

108. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980); see also PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (noting that a common
goal of open trials is the assurance of fairness).
109. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 610.

110. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 585 (1980) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (quoting Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
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perjury might be increased as more persons from various venues have
the opportunity to observe from afar via television, but the reporting of
testimony in trials of public interest is so widespread and instantaneous
today that the increased exposure can be marginal at best. As Justice
Harlan stated in his concurrence in Estes, "[ult is impossible to believe
that the reliability of a trial as a method of finding facts and determining
guilt or innocence increases in relation to the size of the crowd which is
watching it.'
The same analysis applies to the appearance of fairness rationale.
As Chief Justice Burger wrote, "the sure knowledge that anyone is free
to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed
and that deviations will become known."' 2 Similarly, Justice Black
noted that the knowledge that the trial "is subject to contemporaneous
review in the forum of public opinion is [itself] an effective restraint on
possible abuse of judicial power.""'
The most frequently raised argument for allowing cameras in the
federal courts is that it serves to educate the public about the operation
of the judicial system. Although the public educative function has been
included in the rationale for open access to the courts, both Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Harlan emphasized in Estes that the purpose of a
trial is not to educate."4 The educative function cannot be pursued if it is
to be at the expense of the trial's truth-seeking function. In any event,
the educative effect is more a policy rationale than a constitutionally
based reason to compel televising."'
Significantly, one of the few neutral studies conducted on cameras
in the courtrooms questions how much education television provides.
The 1994 evaluation of the pilot program in federal courts conducted by
the Federal Judicial Center found that most courtroom footage was used
merely to illustrate news reports rather than to tell the story through the
words and actions of the participants, and although it provided basic information about the case, it provided little verbal information to viewers
about the legal process. 6
In light of the patent inability of courts to require that televising be
uncut, fair, and comprehensive, there is no reason to assume that the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 595 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,508 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I).
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,270 (1948).
See Estes, 381 U.S. at 575, 589.
See id. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring).

116.

See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF FEDERAL CIVIL

PROCEEDINGS: AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM IN Six DISTRICT COURTS AND TWO
COURTS OF APPEALS 7 (1994).
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televised proceedings will not be primarily of the sensational, notorious,
or shocking portions of a trial that may fail to give the public the wellbalanced look into litigation 1 that
is really necessary to understand how
7
the judicial system operates.'
It follows that the considerations that led the Supreme Court to find

a presumptive right of public access to court proceedings in the First
Amendment do not compel finding a constitutional basis for televising
court proceedings. The issue then is a policy one, not a constitutional
one.
Before Chandler was argued in 1980, there were approximately
nineteen states allowing electronic coverage.' By 1996, as many as
forty-seven states allowed some degree of televising live court proceedings. 9 In contrast, federal courts are bound by both the Criminal Procedure Rule that prohibits electronic media coverage of criminal proceedings"2 and the decision of the Judicial Conference of the United States
to reject its own committee's recommendation to permit the photographing, recording, and broadcasting of civil proceedings.' More recently,
the Judicial Conference authorized the courts of appeals to decide on an
individual basis whether cameras will be allowed at appellate arguments. '
The most telling distinction between the public right of access to
trials and the media's right to televise trials is the likelihood that televising trials may introduce an additional factor into the trial itself. In his
concurrence in Estes, Chief Justice Warren said that "the evil of televised trials ... lies not in the noise and appearance of the cameras, but
117. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 594-95 (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 565 n.6 (1981).
119. See Lassiter, supra note 1, at 929 n.8; RADIO-TELEVISION NEvs DIRECTORS ASS'N,
SUMMARY, STATE CAMERA COVERAGE RULES 1 (1994).
120. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
121. See Marcia Coyle, FederalJudges OK CamerasforAppeals, NAT'L L.J, Mar. 25, 1996,
at A14; Matthew Goldstein, U.S. Judicial Conference Votes to Allow Cameras into Appellate
Courts, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 13, 1996, at 1; Deborah Pines, FederalJudges to Weigh Cameras, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 5, 1996, at 1.
122. See Coyle, supra note 121, at A14; Goldstein, supra note 121, at 1. Fourteen months
after the Judicial Conference rejected a plan to expand the pilot project that was ongoing in some
federal courts, the Judicial Conference narrowly passed a proposal by then Chief Judge Jon 0.
Newman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to allow the individual courts of appeals to determine whether to prohibit cameras in the courtroom or not. See Coyle, supra note 121, at A14.
At this time, only the Second and the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, participants in the Judicial
Conference's pilot program, see FEDERAL JUDICtAL CTR., supra note 116, at 4, have decided to
allow cameras in the courtrooms for civil cases pursuant to the guidelines proscribed by the Court.
See 2d CIR. R. app. part F; 9TH Cm. GUIDELINES FOR PHOTOGRAPHING, RECORDING, AND
BROADCASTING INTHE COURTROOM (1996).
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in the trial participants' awareness that they are being televised.""' Even
in Chandler,which upheld the televising of court proceedings, the Court
expressed concern about "the psychological impact of broadcast coverage upon
the participants in a trial, and particularly upon the defen,124
dant.'
While the Estes Court did not have either scientific or empirical
data to support its lengthy panoply of harmful effects caused by televising trials, neither have the proponents of televised court proceedings
produced substantial and reliable evidence that such effects do not ensue."z Until they do, they will not be able to convince even those who
find attractive the concept of broad public exposure to the judicial system that the media's preoccupation with certain trials, and the posturing
of counsel and witnesses that accompanies televising trials, will not lead
to an unacceptable distortion of the judicial process itself. It is difficult
to disagree with Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that "[t]he right of
the communications media to comment on court proceedings does not
bring with it the right to inject themselves into the fabric of the trial
process to alter the purpose of that process."'26

123. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 570 (Warren, CJ., concurring).
124. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578 (1981).
125. Compare the approach of Chief Justice Warren in Estes, 381 U.S. at 569-70 (Warren,
C.J., concurring), with that in the majority opinion in Chandler,449 U.S. at 578-79.
126. Estes, 381 U.S. at585 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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